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TO WAIVE OR NOT TO WAIVE: NEW YORK AND FEDERAL LAW
ON WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO COMPEL ARBITRATION
I.

INTRODUCTION

Mandatory arbitration clauses are increasingly becoming the norm in
contractual agreements.1 Private-sector employers and the securities industry are the modem forerunners in compelling contracting parties to
2
agree to arbitrate all disputes as a condition of doing business. Often, the
compelled parties-realizing too late that they have forfeited certain legal rights by agreeing to arbitration-file actions in court despite the
binding arbitration clauses.3 The party that conditioned the contract on
the signing of the arbitration clause then has an option to compel arbitration or defend the lawsuit. If the defending party does not immediately
move for dismissal on a jurisdictional objection because of the mandatory arbitration clause, or include the agreement as an affirmative de4
fense in its answer, it may lose its right to compel arbitration.
While an immediate motion to compel arbitration may not be necessary, it is imperative in all jurisdictions to preserve one's right to exercise
that contractual right. The right to compel arbitration based on a contrac5
tual agreement is not absolute in the state or federal courts. A waiver of
that right may result if the defending party participates in the lawsuit,
waits too long to invoke its right to compel arbitration, or simply does
1. See, e.g., Roy Furchgott, EarningIt; OppositionBuilds to Mandatory Arbitration at Work, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1997, at 11 (noting that about 300 companies employed mandatory arbitration as of 1997, as compared with only a few dozen a year earlier).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See, e.g., In re Zimmerman v. Cohen, 139 N.E. 764, 765 (N.Y. 1923); De Sapio
v. Kohlmeyer, 321 N.E.2d 770, 772 (N.Y. 1974); Demsey & Assocs. v. S.S. Sea Star,
461 F.2d 1009, 1017 (2d Cir. 1972); Weight Watchers of Quebec, Ltd. v. Weight Watchers Int'l, Inc., 398 F. Supp. 1057, 1058 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
5. See, e.g., In re Zimmerman, 139 N.E. at 765-66; De Sapio, 321 N.E.2d at 772;
Demsey & Assocs., 461 F.2d at 1017; Weight Watchers of Quebec, Ltd., 398 F. Supp. at
1058.
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not invoke that right at all. Asserting a counterclaim, taking depositions,
or making summary judgment motions are examples of the kind of participation in a lawsuit that may waive the right to compel arbitration.6
Federal courts also require the added element of prejudice to the suing
party.7 The defending party's actions may thus constitute a waiver of its
contractual right to resolve the dispute in an arbitral setting, leaving judicial determination of its dispute as the only available recourse.
New York courts follow a stricter standard than federal courts in determining whether there has been a waiver of the right to compel arbitration. New York courts look to whether the defendant's actions show an
intent to arbitrate.8 In contrast, federal courts emphasize prejudice caused
by defendants to the opposing party9 and are more reluctant to find
waiver.1 Waiver is justified-in both New York and federal courts-on
basic contract principles." Where two parties have contracted for mandatory arbitration of disputes arising out of their contract, the courts have
consistently upheld their binding nature.12
This Note examines the different standards used by the New York
and federal courts in determining whether waiver of the right to compel
arbitration is appropriate. Part ]113 of this Note briefly presents a history
of arbitration and its recent popularity. In particular, it looks at the in-

6. See infra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
7.

See id.

8. See infra note 99 and accompanying text.
9. The different circuits have formulated differing tests, but they all focus generally on the amount of prejudice. See Mark G. Anderson, Note, Waiver of a Contractual

Arbitration Agreement by Causing Prejudice to the Opponent: Should FederalCourts
Adopt a Bright-Line Test?, 1992 J. Disp. REsOL. 175, 180 (1992); Anthony DeToro,
Waiver of the Right to Compel Arbitration in Investor-Broker Disputes, 21 Cu1m.
L.

REv. 615, 621 (1991).
10.
11.

See, e.g., Carcich v. Rederi A/B Nordie, 389 F.2d 692, 696 (2d Cir. 1968).
See generally Leadertex v. Morganton Dyeing & Finishing Corp., 67 F.3d 20

(2d Cir. 1995).
12. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985) (requiring
that courts "rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate").
13. See infra text accompanying notes 17-65.
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offers an introcreasing rise of mandatory arbitration clauses. Part I
Part IV5 exand
laws,
arbitration
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duction to the New York and
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federal
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the
plores the different standards by which
16
the
analyzes
V
Part
particularly the Second Circuit, determine a waiver.
that
argument
reasons for these differences. The Note concludes with the
the New York courts should adopt the less rigid federal standard, because
the state's purposes, aims, and policy considerations in enforcing arbitration clauses do not differ from those embraced by the federal courts.

II.

THE RISE OF ARBITRATION

A. Background ofArbitrationand MandatoryArbitration Clauses
Since the eigtheenth century, arbitration has been a widely accepted
17
businesses used
'form of private adjudication in America. Traditionally,
18 The scope and acceparbitration to settle claims among themselves.
tance of arbitration grew over time to include disputes between busi19
nesses and their customers. Arbitration-a dispute resolution mechanism involving a hearing outside of court by a neutral arbitrator, who
2 -hears the complaint and determines a final and binding resolution
continues to gain favor as an alternative method of dispute resolution to

14. See infra text accompanying notes 66-95.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 96-138.
16. See infratext accompanying notes 139-159.
17. See Michael D. Young, Developments in Commercial Arbitration, 217 N.Y.
L.J. 90 (1997).
18. See Linda R. Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalizationof
ArbitrationLaw, 71 VA. L. REv. 1305, 1309 (1985).
19. See Barry Meier, In Fine Print, Customers Lose Ability to Sue N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 10, 1997, atAl.
20. See generally Joseph Kelner & Robert S. Kelner, AlternateDispute Resolution
has
and the Courts, 208 N.Y. L.J. 19 (1992) ("[Alternate dispute] resolution (ADR)
Id.
profession.").
legal
the
within
and
drawn enormous attention recently in the media
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courtroom battles. 2'
Arbitration clauses have been increasingly used in employment
agreements, particularly following two major and relatively recent
developments in the law. First, Congress reinforced protections under
Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, allowing employees to sue
and collect punitive damages, and thus presenting employers with significant
financial threats from lawsuits.22 Second, in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lange Corp.,23 the Supreme Court upheld mandatory arbitration
agreements for employment discrimination claims in the securities industry.24
In so holding, the Gilmer Court reversed the previously existing
presumption that arbitration is unreliable for the resolution of individuals'
claims based on statutory rights.2 5 The Court rejected the plaintiff's

21. See id.
22. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (West 1994).
23. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
24. See Gilmer,500 U.S. at 27. Plaintiff Gilmer was hired by Interstate
as a "Manager of Financial Services" in 1981. He was 56 years old. In 1987,
at the age of 62, the
plaintiff was fired by Interstate. The plaintiff had registered with
the New York Stock
Exchange, which was a requirement of his employment. The NYSE
registration application contains a provision that registrants "agree to arbitrate any dispute,
claim or controversy arising between him and Interstate that is required to be arbitrated
under the rules,
constitutions or by-laws of the organizations with which I register."
Id. at 23 (internal
quotation marks omitted). The NYSE rules require arbitration of
"[a]ny controversy between a registered representative and any member or member organization
arising out of
the employment or termination of employment of such registered
representative." Id. The
plaintiff unsuccessfully argued that judicial determination of Age
Discrimination in Employment Act claims could not be waived because of the statutory
framework and purposes of the A.D.E.A. See id. at 26-34. The Court has also upheld
enforcement of arbitration agreements with claims arising under other federal statutes: "Sherman
Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1-7; § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j(b); the civil provisions of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO), 18 U.S.C. §
1961 et seq.; and § 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
§ 771(s)." Id. at 26.
25. See id. at 30. But see Lynch v. Pathmark Supermarkets,
987 F. Supp. 236
(S.D.N.Y. 1997). In Lynch, the plaintiff filed a Title VII action
against his former employer claiming that he had been discriminated against because
of his religious beliefs.
The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that an arbitrator's
earlier finding
that it had had just cause for firing the plaintiff due to his disciplinary
history collaterally
estopped an action on Title VII grounds. The court disagreed. While
it recoguized that
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"challenges to the adequacy of arbitration procedures" because "[s]uch
generalized attacks on arbitration 'res[t] on suspicion of arbitration as a
method of weakening the protections afforded in the substantive law to
would-be complainants.' 26 The Court went on to emphasize its "current
strong endorsement of the federal statutes favoring" arbitral resolutions
of statutory claims.27 The Gilmer case effectively enabled the securities
industry to bypass the increased liabilities of Title VII actions. By forcing employees to arbitrate their claims, employers may avoid the harsher
consequences of losing in a court action, such as punitive damages,
which are not remedies available through arbitration.
With these relative advantages of arbitration, its use has rapidly increased. The American Arbitration Association (the "AAA") reported
labor
that between 1972 and 1985, accident case arbitrations grew 13%,
250%.28

increased
arbitrations rose by 70%, and commercial arbitrations

Between 1980 and 1989, the AAA's case filings increased by 15,000

Gilmerhad reversed the presumption that arbitration is an unreliable method of resolving
conflicts based on an individual's statutory rights, it emphasized that arbitration of
Lynch's grievance, which was a condition of his union's collective bargaining agreement,
did not adequately protect his individual right to a fair resolution. Moreover, the mutual
antagonism between the plaintiff and other fellow employees, who were also union
members, pointed to the possibility that the plaintiff did not receive vigorous representation at the arbitration hearing. And finally, the court noted that "the issue of religious bias
as a motivation for [the plaintiff's] termination was clearly not the focus of his decision."
Lynch, 987 F. Supp. at 242.
26. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30 (quoting Rodriquez de Quijas v. Shearson/American
Express, Inc. 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989)).

27. Id.; see also Leslie M. Gillin, A Test ofArbitrability:Does ArbitrationProvide
that
Adequate Protectionfor Aged Employees?, 35 VILL. L. REV.389 (1990) (arguing

arbitration of claims under the A.D.E.A. may not adequately protect elderly employees).
28. See Hirshman,supra note 18, at 1305-06 n.7. The AAA's statistics on arbitration are generally taken to be indicative of the state of arbitration generally. See Dale B.

67
Furnish, Commercial Arbitration Agreements and the Uniform Commercial Code

CAL. L. REv. 317, 317-18 (1979) (explaining exhaustive but ultimately unavailing efforts
to collect statistics on arbitration outside of the AAA and noting that AAA is the dominant center of arbitration).
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cases, or a 36% rise.29 In 1991, the AAA had 62,327 cases-a larger
caseload than any in its prior 66 years.30 In 1997, the caseload numbered

almost 80,000.31 Moreover, as of December 1997, more than 3 million

workers were covered by AAA alternative dispute resolution plans.3 2
In addition to rising numbers, the scope of arbitration has also

grown. For many corporations, in-house arbitration policies covering

everything from "employment and commercial disputes, [have]
ex-

panded to cover conflicts involving 'intellectual property, personal in-

jury, product liability, suppliers and dealers, and franchising.' ' 33 Arbitration clauses have covered: the sale of condominiums; 34 credit cards,
bank
accounts, and personal loans; 35 real estate agents; 36 false advertising
claims against mortgage companies; 37 medical malpractice claims; 38
defective computers;39 and health plan policies.40
B. Advantages andDisadvantages
There are arguments pro and con for arbitration. Arguments in favor
29. See Carolyn M. Penna, American Arbitration Association: Facts
and Figures
on the Caseload,203 N.Y. L.J. 3 (May 11, 1990).
30. See Carolyn M. Penna, Caseload Trends: A Statistical View,
208 N.Y. L.J. 3
(July 7, 1992).
31. See American Arbitration Association, Press Release, American
Arbitration
Association Establishes Center for Educational Outreach (Dec. 22, 1997).
32.

See

AMERIcAN

ARBITRATION

ASSOCIATION,

RESOLVING

EMPLOYMENT

DIsPur s: A PRACriCAL GUIDE (1997).
33. Dominic Bencivenga, Extending ADR's Reach:In-House Counsel
Adopt "AllDispute"Policies,217 N.Y. L.J. 5 (May 29, 1997) (quoting James F.
Henry, president of
New York's CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution).
34. See Matthew J. Leeds, MandatingArbitration in a Condo, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug.
17, 1997, § 9, at 8.
35. See Meier, supra note 19, at Al.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See id.
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in time and money, than
of arbitration include the following: it costs less,
42

and it provides a satisfaclitigation;41 it unclogs crowded court dockets;
43
tory resolution in a less adversarial setting.

On the other hand, the fol-

lowing are some of the arguments against arbitration: it does not always
45

reduce cost; 44 it denies public access to information about wrongdoing;
46
it emphasizes speed over justice; it capitalizes on unequal bargaining
8
4
and
power;47 it creates unfairness; it "lacks full appeal on the merits
L. REV.
41. See generally, John H. Barton, Behind the Legal Explosion, 27 STAN.
1985)
(N.Y.
772
N.E.2d
475
Inc.,
Builders,
Grayco
v.
567 (1975). See also Sherrill
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disclosure
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"freedom
to
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is
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time
the
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Fund Insurance
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fact.").
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law
of
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for
review
rules, and from judicial
seven-month period
Company's Long Island claims office reported saving $217,000 in a
from eliminating
by arbitrating instead of litigating claims, most of the savings coming
at 3. Corporate
"extraneous expert expenses and defense costs." Kelner, supra note 20,
often embarand
time-consuming,
and
costly
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America constantly looks for alternatives
agreed to
had
companies
big
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especially appeal to
and
mediation,
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court,
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by
plaintiffs, who typically prefer to have their claims heard
gener42. See Kelner, supra note 20, at 3; Furchgott, supra note 1, at 11 ("Judges
emphait
think
some
although
clear,
dockets
keep
ally like arbitration because it helps
sizes speed over justice.").
as saying "the
43. See Bencivenga, supra note 33, at 5 (quoting one executive
individuals to
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fashion
greatest benefit [of arbitration] is it is a very non-adversarial
quickly.").
resolve disputes very, very
Goodman &
44. See id. (quoting Pearl Zuchlewski, plaintiff attorney and partner at
expensive.").
less
[or]
efficient
more
not
is
"It
Zuchlewski:
get the in45. See Meier, supra note 19, at Al (warning that "[t]he public cannot
trial.").
a
was
there
if
formation to protect themselves, the way they can
46. See Furchgott, supra note 1, at 11.
47. See Meier, supra note 19, at Al; Furchgott, supra note 1, at 11.
After all, "[b]y
48. I do not speak, of fairness in terms of "equitable" judgments.
may get it
arbitrator
the
that
risk
the
assumed
agreeing to arbitration, the parties have
International
in
Context
and
Text
Park,
W.
William
dispute."
the
of
wrong on the merits
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evidence. ' 49

formal rules of
In addition, arbitrators are not always neutral5 ° or wield too much power; 51 there are no licensing
requirements for
arbitrators nor a regulatory body governing them; 52 and
parties may be
blind sided into accepting arbitration clauses. 53
Dispute Resolution, 15 B.U. INT'L L.J. 191, 200 (1997). However,
the California Court of
Appeals recently ruled that a hotel's arbitration process was so
unfair that it could not be
binding, so the plaintiff could sue in court. In that case, the plaintiff's
governed by an employee handbook, which required that all disputes employment was
relating to her job
would be resolved by a committee of two hotel managers and
two hotel employees selected by the executives who had fired her. In addition, the
would determine who would testify on her behalf, and in thehotel's personnel department
event of a deadlock, one of
the hotel executives would break it. See Cheng-Canindin v. Renaissance
Hotel, 57 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 867 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
For an even more dramatic criticism that mandatory arbitration
clauses may be unconstitutional, not just unfair, see Richard E. Coulson, Is Contractual
Arbitration an Unconstitutional Waiver of the Right to Trial by Jury in Oklahoma?,
16 OKLA. CITY U. L.
REV. 1 (1991).

49. Park, supra note 48, at 198.
50. InGilmer, the Court explicitly rejected the plaintiff's claim
industry's panel would be biased against him, stating, "[w]e decline that the securities
sumption that the parties and arbitral body conducting a proceeding to indulge the preunwilling to retain competent, conscientious and impartial arbitrators." will be unable or
Gilmer, 500 U.S.
at 30. Cf Bencivenga, supra note 33, at 5 (quoting Sullivan &
law partner who believes arbitrators' focus on fairness may help Cromwell employment
a weaker party because
"[alrbitrators are known for splitting the baby"). Arbitrators
are typically chosen from
trade associations or companies with professional for-hire arbitrators.
51. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7505 (McKinney 1997) ("An
ney of record in the arbitration proceeding has the power to issuearbitrator and any attortor has the power to administer oaths."). Arbitrators also decide subpoenas. An arbitracause they are not judges and because their decisions are binding, questions of law. Bethere is often a perception that they wield too much power. See, e.g., John F.X. Peloso
and Stuart M. Samoff,
Whether ArbitratorsHave

a Duty to Apply the Law, 215 N.Y. L.J. 75 (1996). In
New
York, arbitrators are under no duty to apply the law in rendering
an award. See id.
52.

See Abraham Fuchsberg, The Arbitrariness of Arbitrators,
208 N.Y. L.J. 2

(July 21, 1992).
53. See, e.g., Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1148
(7th Cir. 1997). The
plaintiffs argued that an arbitration clause sent with a computer
in the shipping box was
not prominently displayed in the information's statement of terms.
plaintiffs were bound by the mandatory arbitration clause, even The court held that the
though they had not read
the statement of terms included in the computer box. The court
reasoned that a "contract
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The U.S. Supreme Court has been strictly pro-arbitration. It rejects

"generalized attacks on arbitration [because they] 'res[t] on suspicion of
arbitration as a method of weakening the protections afforded in the substantive law to would-be complainants,' and as such, they are 'far out of
of the federal statutes favoring
step with our current strong endorsement
54
disputes."'
this method of resolving
C. Mandatory or Voluntary
In addition to the "to arbitrate or not to arbitrate" debate, there is
considerable debate on whether arbitration should be mandatory or voladvocates
56
untary.5 5 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
the Civil Rights Act.
of
VII
Title
under
claims
for
voluntary arbitration
Congress has only considered legislation that would prohibit mandatory
57
arbitration for Title VII claims. The National Association of Securities
Dealers is due to release new proposed rules on whether employment
58
disputes should continue to be arbitrated. Even a past president of one

of the two biggest arbitration associations questions the fairness of many

terms
need not be read to be effective; people who accept take the risk that the unread
be even more
may in retrospect prove unvelcome." Id. The agreement to arbitrate may
out custominconspicuously procured. Many times, companies "have unilaterally wiped
the form of
in
requirements
arbitration
new
of
notices
out
sending
by
sue
to
ers' right
envelope stuffers." Meier, supra note 19, at Al.
54. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30 (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477,481 (1989)).
and currently
55. Michael J. Dontzin, a retired New York Supreme Court justice
should
"never
A.D.R.
that
believes
Inc.,
Endispute,
of
officer
judicial
chief
York's
New
be mandatory." Kelner, supra note 20, at 3.
(quoting an
56. See Bencivenga, supra note 33, at 5; Furchgott, supra note 1, at 11
view is that
"Our
stating,
as
Commission
Opportunity
Employment
attorney for the Equal
'mandatory' is the problem. We support voluntary forms of dispute resolution, including
arbitration.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
11
57. See Bencivenga, supra note 33, at 5; Furchgott, supra note 1, at
11.
at
1,
note
supra
Furchgott,
58. See Bencivenga, supra note 33, at 5;
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mandatory arbitration policies. 59 Recently, the American Civil Liberties

Union brought a suit against two California law firms, stating
that the

firms' mandatory arbitration policies violate federal and state constitu60
tional guarantees of trial by jury and access to the courts.

Proponents of mandatory arbitration reject voluntary arbitration as

defeating the advantages of arbitration. 6 1 Whether they discover
the arbitration clause too late, 62 or they simply change their minds, 63 parties

forced to sign mandatory arbitration clauses are still trying to take their

battles to court-sometimes after hearing the opposing party's
strategy
and arguments put forth in the initial stages of arbitration. 64
Because
most courts recognize the binding nature of arbitration clauses,
the lawsuits are generally stayed pending arbitration. However, in
some instances, the other side may decide to defend the lawsuit instead
of compelling arbitration. 65 In such cases, the question then becomes the
follow-

59. See Furchgott, supra note 1, at 11 ("Many employers have
adopted arbitration
plans. Many are mandatory, and many are quite unfair.") (quoting
George Nicolau, past
president of the National Academy of Arbitrators).
60. See Jenna Ward, Secretary v. Firms;Arbitration Clause
Assailed, NAT'L L.J.,
Mar. 2, 1998, at A4. The plaintiff refused to sign arbitration agreements
at each law firm
and was fired immediately by both firms.
61. See Bencivenga, supra note 33, at 5.
62. See id.
63. This argument would probably not fare well. In the cases
surveyed by the author, most courts are reluctant to find an arbitration clause invalid
unless there are legal
grounds for the finding. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1947) (stating that
an agreement to submit
disputes to arbitration "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.").
64. See Bencivenga, supra note 33, at 5.
65. There are presumably an unlimited number of reasons for
the decision to pursue an action at law. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Kisly, 461 N.Y.S.2d
808 (App. Div. 1983)
(inability to obtain copy of agreement containing arbitration clause
because marital problems precluded party from entering his home); Rush v. Oppenheimer
& Co., 779 F.2d
885 (2d Cir. 1985) (party continued participating in court action
because believed issues
to be the same as those which would be arbitrated, until punitive
damages became an
issue); Leadertex, Inc. v. Morganton Dyeing & Finishing Corp.,
67 F.3d 20, 26 (2d Cir.
1995) (did not have a copy of the contract in question); Weight
Watchers of Quebec, Ltd.
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ing: At what point should a party that could have compelled arbitration
lose that right?
Ell.

A.

THE ARBITRATION LAWS

New YorkArbitration Law

The New York arbitration law is codified in Article 75 of the Civil
Practice Law & Rules.6 6 Section 7501 gives effect to arbitration agreements. 7 The section gives sweeping authority to written arbitration
agreements, such that they are "enforceable without regard to the justiciable character of the controversy. ' 68 It also "confers jurisdiction on the
on an award;" 69
courts of the state to enforce it and to enter judgment
however, judicial intervention is otherwise severely limited by prohibiting courts from "consider[ing] whether the claim with respect to which
arbitration is sought is tenable, or otherwise pass[ing] upon the merits of
the dispute." 70
Other provisions of Article 75 define procedures for making applica72
tions to the court;71 address jurisdictional and statute of limitations isv. Weight Watchers Int'l, Inc., 398 F. Supp. 1057, 1060 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (party did not

see basis for suit).
66. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7501-7514 (McKinney 1999).
67. Id. 7501 states that:
A written agreement to submit any controversy thereafter arising or
any existing controversy to arbitration is enforceable without regard
to the justiciable character of the controversy and confers jurisdiction
on the courts of the state to enforce it and to enter judgment on an
award. In determining any matter arising under this article, the court
shall not consider whether the claim with respect to which arbitration
is sought is tenable, or otherwise pass upon the merits of the dispute.
68.
69.
70.

71.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. 7502(a), 7503(a)-(b).
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sues;73 deal with arbitrators; 74 prescribe certain rights and requirements

for arbitral hearings; 75 and discuss various issues involving arbitration
awards. 76 Section 7503 outlines the procedures for applying for a stay of
action; 77 for compelling arbitration; 78 and making notice of an intent to
79
arbitrate.
B. FederalArbitrationLaw
The Federal Arbitration Act (the "FAA") is codified in Title 9 of the
United States Code. 80 Section 2 gives effect to a written arbitration
agreement's validity, irrevocability, and enforcement.8 1 While the federal
law is more limited in scope-to maritime transactions 82 and contracts
72. See id.7502(a).
73. See id. 7502(b).
74. Seeid. 7504, 7505.
75. See id. 7506.
76. See id. 7507 ("Award; form; time; delivery."); 7508 ("Award by confession.");
7509 ("Modification of award by arbitrator.'); 7510 ("Confirmation of award.'); 7511
("Vacating or modifying award."); 7514 ("Judgment on an award.').
77. See id.7503(a).
78. See id.
79. See id. 7503(c).
80. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1998).
81. Id. § 2 (1998) states in full:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the
refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in
writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of
such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract.
82. "Maritime transactions" are defined as "charter parties, bills of lading of water
carriers, agreements relating to wharfage, supplies furnished vessels or repairs to vessels,
collisions, or any other matters in foreign commerce which, if the subject of controversy,
would be embraced within admiralty jurisdiction." Id. § 1 (1998).
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evidencing commercial transactions 3 -it too confers sweeping authority

on written arbitration agreements. 84 The Supreme Court has held that the
FAA settles any doubts as to whether "the scope of arbitrable issues
should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is
the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver,
delay, or a like defense to arbitrability. '' 85 The Act's primary goal is not
but to support the authority of
to promote efficiency or judicial
86 economy
agreements.
arbitration
written
The FAA applies not only in federal courts but also in state courts in
actions involving "interstate commerce." 87 The Supreme Court recently
interpreted this concept broadly. 88 The parties need not actually contemplate doing business across state borders as long as such interstate commerce occurs. 89 Thus, in state court actions involving interstate com-

83.

"Commerce" is defined as:
[C]ommerce among the several States or with foreign nations, or in
any Territory of the United States or in the District of Columbia, or
between any such Territory and another, or between any such Territory and any State or foreign nation, or between the District of Columbia and any State or Territory or foreign nation, but nothing
herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen,
railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign
or interstate commerce.

Id.

84. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1998). As discussed more fully below, the ambiguity of "a
contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce" allows many state court-bound
plaintiffs to move into the more waiver-friendly federal system. See infra text accompanying note 90.
85. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25
(1983).
86. See Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., 779 F.2d 885, 891 (2d Cir. 1985).
87. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1984).
88. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 278-82 (1995) (rejecting narrow construction of "interstate commerce," which would have confined application of the FAA only to transactions in which parties actually contemplated activities in
more than one state).
89.

See id.
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merce, the FAA preempts the application of state arbitration laws that

may be more restrictive than the federal law.90
The federal law also contains provisions dealing with the powers of
91

arbitrators, applications to the court, 92 witnesses,9 3 and awards and
judgments.94 The Act does not apply to contracts made before January 1,
1926. 9'
IV.

WAIVER LAW: NEW YORK AND FEDERAL STANDARDS

A. New York Waiver Law

In New York, a party's right to compel arbitration is not absolute and

can be forfeited at any time prior to trial. 9 6 "The crucial question ... is
what degree of participation by the defendant in the action will create a

waiver of a right to stay the action [and compel arbitration].

97

Absent

unreasonable delay, there is no waiver if the "defendant's actions are

consistent with an assertion of the right to arbitrate," such as only taking

90. See Park, supra note 48, at 204. See generally Hirshman, supra note
18(examining the increasing scope of the FAA and its effect on state arbitration laws).
One example of New York's more restrictive arbitration law is its prohibition against
punitive damage awards by arbitrators as a matter of public policy. See, e.g., Garrity v.
Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1976).
91. See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. §§ 5,9, 10, 11 (1998).
92. See id. § 3 ("Stay of proceedings where issue therein referable to arbitration");
9 U.S.C. § 4 ("Failure to arbitrate under agreement; petition to United States court having
jurisdiction for order to compel arbitration; notice and service thereof; hearing and determination"); 9 U.S.C. § 6 ("Application heard as motion"); Id. § 12 ("Notice of motions
to vacate or modify; service; stay of proceedings").
93. See id.§ 7.
94. See, e.g., id. §§ 9-11, 13.
95. See id. § 14.
96. See generally Matter ofZimmerman v. Cohen, 139 N.E. 764 (N.Y. 1923); De
Sapio v. Kohlmeyer, 321 N.E.2d 770 (N.Y. 1974).
97. De Sapio, 321 N.E.2d at 772.
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defensive action. 98 "However,where the defendant's participation in the
lawsuit manifests an affirmative acceptance of the judicial forum, with
whatever advantages it may offer in the particular case, his actions are
with a later claim that only the arbitral forum is satisthen inconsistent
99
factory."
100
No one act establishes that a party has waived its right to arbitrate.
right to stay the action
The courts have found no waiver of a defendant's
1' 1 an answer was filed; 10 2
delay;
was
there
where:
and compel arbitration
stipua party filed an answer and asserted affirmative defenses;parties
5
0
4
lated on time to answer,' notice of deposition was served; and a party
moved for protective relief to maintain the status quo to assert its right to
compel arbitration. 0 6 By contrast, the courts have found a waiver of a
defendant's right to stay the action and compel arbitration where: there
17
was a contest on the merits through the judicial process; 0 defendant
09
08
pursued discovery;1 and cross-claims were asserted.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See Sherrill v. Grayco Builders, Inc., 475 N.E.2d 772, 776 (N.Y. 1985) (stating that "not every foray into the courthouse affects a waiver of the right to arbitrate").
101. See, e.g., City Trade & Indus., Ltd. v. New Cent. Jute Mills Co., Ltd., 250
N.E.2d 52, 55-56 (N.Y. 1969) (delay and arbitration request made before answer).
102. See, e.g., Matter of Hosiery Mgrs. Corp. v. Goldston, 143 N.E. 779 (N.Y.
1924).
103. See, e.g., BR Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. Nationwide Nassau Ambulance, 542
N.Y.S.2d 21 (App. Div. 1989).
104. See, e.g., Matter ofHaupt v. Rose, 191 N.E. 853 (N.Y. 1934) (finding stipulation extending time for defendant to move or answer purely a defensive act and not inconsistent with later attempt to force arbitration). "By tradition a defendant may ordinarily let a sleeping dog lie until he is in danger of being bitten; though he may play with the
danger too long." Id. at 111.
105. See, e.g., Jade Press, Inc. v. Packard, 398 N.Y.S.2d 785, 787 (Civ. Ct. 1977)
(noting that mere notice to take depositions is "tentative and inchoate").
106. See Preiss/Breismeister v. Westin Hotel. Co., 437 N.E.2d 1154 (N.Y. 1982).
107. See, e.g., Gold Plastering, Co., Inc. v. 200 East End Ave. Corp., 120 N.E.2d
846 (N.Y. 1954); Board of Ed. v. Mancuso Bros., 204 N.Y.S.2d 410 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
108. See, e.g., De Sapio, 321 N.E.2d at 772.
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B. FederalWaiver Law
The Supreme Court has repeatedly supported the federal law's strong
presumption in favor of arbitration.' 1 ° This presumption favoring arbitration requires that courts "rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate."'.
Thus, a waiver of a party's right to compel arbitration "is not to be
lightly inferred, and mere delay in seeking a stay of the proceeding without some resultant prejudice to a party ... cannot carry the day."' 1 2 As a
result of this pro-arbitration policy, any doubts as to whether a waiver
has been effected are to be resolved in favor of arbitration.1' 3 Congress's
"preeminent concern ... was to enforce private agreements, ... and that
concern requires that we vigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate, even
if the result is 'piecemeal' litigation."'1 14 The party arguing for waiver,
therefore, has a "heavy burden" to rebut this presumption.' 1 5
Arbitration agreements can still be waived, however, despite the
strong federal policy favoring their enforcement.' 16 Waiver is usually
found only when a party participates in litigation that results in prejudice
to the other party. 117 The question of what amounts to a waiver of the
contractual right to arbitrate is resolved on a case-by-case determination.
Traditionally, the courts focus on "whether a party's pretrial litigation
109.

See id.

110. See Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24
(1983) (stating that "questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for
the federal policy favoring arbitration"); Kramer v. Hammond, 943 F.2d 176, 178 (2d
Cir. 1991).
111. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213,221 (1985).
112. Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., 779 F.2d 885, 887 (2d Cir. 1985) (quoting Carcich v. Rederi AIB Noric, 389 F.2d 692, 696 (2d Cir. 1968)).
113.
114.

SeeMosesH. Cone Mem'lHosp., 401 U.S. at24-25.
Dean Witter Reynolds, 470 U.S. at 221.

115. See Sweater Bee by Banff, Ltd. v. Manhattan Indus., Inc., 754 F.2d 457, 466
(2d Cir. 1985).
116. See Demsey & Assocs. v. Steamship Sea Star, 461 F.2d 1009, 1017 (2d Cir.
1972).
117. See Rush, 779 F.2d at 887; Carcich v. Rederi A/B Nordie, 389 F.2d 692, 696
(2d Cir. 1968).
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' 18
activities touch upon the merits of the case." Of course, any participaclause.119
tion in a lawsuit does not automatically waive an arbitration
The circuit courts of appeals have articulated different tests to determine
but all tests focus on
when a party forfeits the right to compel 1arbitration,
20
party.
other
the
by
suffered
prejudice
the
Under the Second Circuit's test,' 2 ' defendants may waive their right
of arbitration when they engage in "protracted litigation" that prejudices
the opposing party. 122 The court has articulated two forms of prejudice:
2
substantive prejudice and prejudice caused by delay or expense. Substantive prejudice occurs when a party loses on the merits in a judicial
forum and tries to relitigate by compelling arbitration of the same issue. 124 Prejudice caused by delay or expense occurs when a party waits
too long to invoke arbitration and causes unnecessary delay or expense. 2' "No bright line defines this second type of prejudice-neither a

118. Anderson, supra note 9, at 179-80. See also Chatham Shipping Co. v. Fertex
S.S. Corp., 352 F.2d 291, 293 (2d Cir. 1965) (stating that the earliest stage when a waiver
may be found "is when the other party files an answer on the merits").
119. SeeDemsey, 461 F.2d at 1017.
120. See Anderson, supranote 9, at 180.
121. See id. at 180-87 (discussing other circuits' tests). The author explores the
possibility of formulating a bright-line test as the federal waiver standard, such as one
based on the costs incurred by the opposing party and on the period of time passing after
the pleading is filed. See id. at 196. He ultimately rejects such a standard because it
would create collateral issues and be easily abused. See id.
122. See Com-Tech Assoc. v. Computer Assoc., 938 F.2d 1574, 1576 (2d Cir.
1991); Rush, 779 F.2d at 887-88 (holding that waiver of the right to compel arbitration
due to participation in litigation may be found only when prejudice to the other party is
demonstrated).
123. See Kramer v. Hammond, 943 F.2d 176, 179 (2d Cir. 1991).
124. See id.
125. See id. Compare Com-Tech Assoc., 938 F.2d at 1576 (holding that the party's
"protracted litigation" activities, such as full participation in discovery, making of motions relating to the merits, and delaying the motion to compel arbitration until late in the
process, resulted in waiver), with Rush, 779 F.2d at 887-88 (holding that delay of eight
months prior to moving to compel arbitration, participation in extensive discovery, motion to dismiss, and answering of complaint without raising the arbitration clause as an
affmative defense did not result in waiver because there was no showing of prejudice).
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particular time frame nor dollar amount automatically results in such a

finding-but it is instead determined contextually, by examining the extent of the delay, the degree of litigation that has preceded the invocation
of arbitration, the resulting burdens and expenses, and the other surrounding circumstances.' 26
In an illustrative case, Leadertex, Inc. v. Morganton Dyeing & Finishing Corp., 27 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that
Morganton, the defendant, had waived its right to compel arbitration due
to a seven-month delay and the resulting economic prejudice that plaintiff Leadertex suffered. 128 Leadertex had filed an action in state court su-

ing Morganton for breach of contract, negligence, and breach of warranty. 129 In response, Morganton removed the case to federal court and
filed a counterclaim. 30 At that point, it had not asserted its right to arbi1
tration. 13
After Morganton removed the case to federal court, it engaged in
vigorous discovery, demanding document production, submitting interrogatories, and scheduling depositions.13 2 With discovery completed and

the trial date a month away, Leadertex filed a motion for partial summary
judgment on its replevin action for material in Morganton's posses-

126. Kramer, 943 F.2d at 179.
127. 67 F.3d 20 (2d Cir. 1995). Plaintiff, a small family-ovrned textile converting
corporation, contracted with Morganton, a North Carolina fabric dyer corporation, for
dyeing and warehousing services. Each shipment of fabric sent to Morganton was accompanied by a standard contract form, each containing an arbitration and lien provision.
At some point, a dispute arose over some defective goods. Leadertex customers began
returning fabric because of unacceptable quality. Leadertex blamed Morganton of defective dyeing; Morganton claimed that the defects in the dyed fabric were due to substandard fabric that Leadertex had provided. Leadertex refused to pay invoices on the defective goods, and Morganton, in accordance with the lien provision, refused to release the
remaining Leadertex materials that it had in stock.
128. See id.at 26-27.
129. See id. at 23.
130. See id.
131. Seeid. at24.
132. See id.
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sion. 133 Seven months into the lawsuit-with discovery completed, and
the trial1 a month away-Morganton made a cross-motion to compel arbitration. 14
The district court held that Morganton had waived its right to compel
arbitration.13 5 The court found that Leadertex had suffered severe economic prejudice by Morganton's delay in asserting its right and partici136
pating in extensive discovery. The Second Circuit affirmed the district
1 37
court's finding of waiver. However, the appellate court concluded that
no prejudice resulted from Morganton's participation in discovery because everything discovered1 38in that process could have been discovered
through the arbitral process.
V. COMMENTARY

New York should adopt the federal standard on finding waiver of the
right to compel arbitration. The rising use of mandatory arbitration
clauses and an already crowded state court system call for a re-evaluation
of New York courts' reluctance to find waiver. In addition, the policy
reasons behind enforcing arbitration agreements in New York and federal law are identical. Therefore, policy considerations should not account for the different standards used by the states and federal courts.
A. Rise ofMandatoryArbitration Clauses
The American Arbitration Association has witnessed a phenomenal
13 9
growth in companies using mandatory arbitration. In one year, the
number of companies with mandatory arbitration policies grew from a

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 26-27.
See id. at 26.
See Furchgott, supranote 1, at 11.
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couple dozen to 300.140 In a survey of over half of America's 1,000 largest companies, seventy-nine percent responded that they have
used
41
arbitration.1
B.

CrowdedNew York Dockets

New York courts are notoriously plagued by delay and back-log.142
The legal profession, judiciary, and business community have become
increasingly drawn to arbitration and other alternative dispute resolution
options as a way to relieve the clogging of court calendars. 43 Judicial
remedies include proposals to revamp the judicial system, 144 resort
to
4
alternative
courts,1
and
court
referrals
to alternative dispute resolution
146
venues.

C. Policy Considerations
There are striking similarities between the federal and New York
waiver laws. In 1920, New York enacted the first law, establishing the
140. See id.
141. See Today's News: Update; 217 N.Y. L.J. 1 (Apr. 29, 1997).
The survey,
conducted by Cornell University, the Foundation for the Prevention
and Early Resolution
of Conflict, and Price Waterhouse's consulting unit, was based on
responses from 530 of
America's 1,000 largest companies. See id.
142. See, e.g., Gary Spencer, OCA Seeks 5.8% Morefor Court Budget,
218 N.Y.
L.J. 1 (Dec. 2, 1997) ("Trial court filings reached a record high of
3.9 million last year,
with most of the growth occurring in the lower Criminal Courts, Family
Courts and civil
terms of the Supreme Courts.").
143. See Kelner, supranote 20, at 3.
144. See generally New York State Unified Court System, Communications
Office, Press Release, Proposal to Reform New York State Court System
Submitted to Legislature (Mar. 19, 1997).
145. See NEw YORK STATE UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM,

1996

STATE OF THE

JUDICIARY: STRONG.

146. See NEw YoRK STATE COURT ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
PROJECT,
COURT-REFERRED A.D.R. IN N.Y. STATE: FINAL REPORT
OF THE CHIEF JUDGE'S N.Y.
STATE COURT ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROJECT
31 (May 1, 1996).
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validity of arbitration agreements 1 47 In 1925, Congress based the Federal
148
Arbitration Act on the New York statute. In enacting the FAA, Conagreements were
gress asserted two goals: (1) to ensure that arbitration
' 149 and (2) to provide an
contracts
other
as
footing
put "upon the same
0
alternative to litigation. 15 New York courts have repeatedly articulated
151
the state's public policy favoring arbitration. Like Congress in enact147. See Act of Apr. 19, 1920, ch. 275, 1920 N.Y. Laws 803. The original law

provided, in pertinent part:

§ 2. Validity of arbitration agreements. A provision in a written contract to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising between
the parties to the contract, or a submission hereafter entered into of an
existing controversy to arbitration pursuant to title eight of chapter
seventeen of the code of civil procedure, shall be valid, enforcible
[sic] and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
1920 N.Y. Laws at 804.
For a history on New York's efforts to enact the original legislation, see J. COHEN,
2 of
COMERCIAL ARBTRATON AND THE LAW 1-9 (1918); Erie, Bernhardt,and Section
the United States ArbitrationAct: A Farragoof Rights, Remedies, and a Right to a Remedy, 69 YALE L.J. 847, 854 n.41 (1960).

148. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Co., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265,278-82 (1995);
Hirshman, supra note 18, at 1312.
149. H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1 (1924). See also S. REP. No. 68-536, at 3 (1924)

agree(discussing "practical justice in the enforced arbitration of disputes where written
into").
entered
solemnly
and
voluntarily
been
have
purpose
that
for
ments
150. See H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 2 (1924) ("It is practically appropriate that [the
Act should be enacted] at this time when there is so much agitation against the costliness
arbiand delays of litigation. These matters can be largely eliminated by agreements for
tration, if arbitration agreements are made valid and enforceable."); S. REP. No. 68-536,
The
at 3 (1924) ("The desire to avoid the delay and expense of litigation persists ....
alike, to
business
little
and
business
big
to
appeals
arbitration
by
disputes
of
settlement
of
corporate interests as well as to individuals."); 65 CONG. REC. 11081 (1924) (statement
litigaexpensive
of
lot
a
with
away
do
to
be
will
bill
a
such
of
Rep. Dyer) ("The result
tion.").
151. See Lory Fabrics, Inc. v. Dress Rehearsal, Inc., 434 N.Y.S.2d 359, 363 (App.
that New
Div. 1980); Miner v. Walden, 422 N.Y.S.2d 335, 339 (Sup. Ct. 1979) (noting
in
common
delays
avoids
expeditious,
is
it
because
litigation
over
arbitration
York favors
(Civ.
863
861,
N.Y.S.2d
429
litigation, and reduces court congestion); Ferber v. Schultz,
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ing the FAA, the New York legislation sought to enforce private agreements entered into by willing parties. The language of section 7501
of
New York's Civil Practice Law and Rules makes it forcefully clear
that
"[a] written agreement to submit any controversy thereafter arising
or
any existing controversy to arbitration is enforceable without regard
to
the justiciable character of the controversy."" 2 New York and federal
laws and policy fiercely protect the authority of arbitration agreements.
Notwithstanding these similarities, New York courts adhere to
a
stricter standard in finding waiver. This disparity cannot be explained
away by a more vigilant defense of arbitration on the part of the
state;
federal law continues to be much more broadly pro-arbitration.1 3
The
disparity, likewise, cannot be reconciled by New York courts' duty
to
follow common law precedents, because each case is determined
on a
case-by-case, totality-of-the-circumstances determination. In a survey
of
waiver cases based on New York law from 1930 to 1998, it is difficult
to
find a uniform test for finding waiver. The standard used by the courts,
broadly stated, is to the parties' intentions to see if they acted with
the
intention of arbitrating or litigating. With New York's subjective
standard, however, one state court may find a waiver where another will
not.
The Leadertex case is especially interesting because the Second Circuit mixed federal and New York waiver laws. The court discussed
the
federal policy favoring arbitration, resolving doubtful questions
of
waiver in favor of arbitration and requiring that a waiver not be lightly
inferred.154 It also laid down the test to be used in terms of the federal
Ct. 1980) (emphasizing that policy of state favors and encourages
arbitration because it
conserves time and resources); Guadano v. Long Island Plastic Surgical
Group, P.C., 607
F. Supp. 136, 139 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (explaining that New York
public policy favors
arbitration because it conserves financial resources of contracting parties).
152. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7501 (McKinney 1999).
153. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 278-82
(1995) (The
FAA applies not just in federal courts, but also in state courts involving
interstate commerce. Courts find interstate commerce when any commerce occurs
across state lines,
even if the parties did not contemplate such business.)
154. See Leadertex v. Morganton Dyeing & Finishing Corp., 67
F.3d 20, 25 (2d
Cir. 1995).
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55
substantial litigation-delay-prejudice test.' Yet, in deciding the waiver
New York law-Morganton had waived
issue, the court held that-under
156
arbitration.
its right to compel
The circuit court imposed the prejudice requirement into New York
157
law and resolved the case on that issue. Although the court determined
that there had been no prejudice caused by Morganton's extensive discovery (a fact that under New York's test might very well have established waiver), the court158found that economic prejudice had resulted
from Morganton's delay.

VI.

CONCLUSION

The difficulty in determining whether a party has waived its right to
compel arbitration arises from the New York courts' failure to formulate
a clear rule. The emphasis on intent and degree of litigation are too subjective. By adopting the federal test-which relies on a much more demonstrable showing of prejudice-the state's courts would wield a more
manageable tool and provide a more enlightening guide for future litigants. By not adopting a similarly formulated rule, the state courts also
159
thus encourage forum-shopping. But, perhaps parties cannot be faulted
for preferring to be in a court where their issues will be clearly-and
therefore in their eyes more fairly-resolved.

155. See id.
156. See id. at 26.
157. See id. at 26-27.
158. See id. at 27.

159. While allowing parties to leave the state court system for the federal system
may have the added benefit of alleviating state court dockets, this does not comport with
the purposes of enforcing arbitration. As noted above, efficiency and judicial economy
at
are not concerns of the FAA or New York's Arbitration Law. See Park, supra note 48,
FAA
204. See generally Hirshman,supra note 18 (examining the increasing scope of the
and its effect on state arbitration laws). One example of New York's more restrictive
arbitration law is its prohibition against punitive damage awards by arbitrators as a matter
of public policy. See, e.g., Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1976).
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New York should follow the federal rule on waiver of the right
to
compel arbitration. Mandatory arbitration policies are being used
more
and more frequently in increasing numbers of areas. Court dockets
continue to grow uncontrollably. Moreover, New York shares the same
proarbitration policy that the federal law embraces. While the state and
federal waiver standards are in spirit, aim, and purpose the same, the
New
York standard does not go far enough. Adding the requirement
of a
"prejudice" finding would make the state's very subjective
standard
more objective, and thus more manageable.
Anna Sim

